Intl. Relief Fund v. R. – FCA: Court Strictly Limits Record on Appeal of Revocation of a Charity’s Registration

Bill Innes on Current Tax Cases

http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/site/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/63018/index.do New Window

International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (Canada) v. The Queen[1] (July 5, 2013) is a procedural decision in an appeal challenging the Minister’s revocation of the registration of a charity:

A.                The pending appeal

[1]               The appellant, the International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (Canada), used to be registered as a charity under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.). On December 11, 2011, the Minister of National Revenue issued a Notice of Confirmation of her decision to revoke the appellant’s registration. The appellant appeals the December 11, 2011 Notice under subsection 172(3) of the Act.

[2]               In its appeal, the appellant alleges that the Minister abused her discretion and acted unreasonably, in a procedurally unfair manner, and with a closed mind. The appellant also alleges that the Minister’s decision violates sections 2 and 15 of the Charter by violating its “associational rights with partner organizations abroad and charitable contributing communities and individuals in Canada” and its equality rights.

B.        The nature of the pending appeal

[3]               The pending appeal is from an administrative decision, the making of the Notice, made by an administrative decision-maker, the Minister. The only relief sought is the “vacating of the assessment,” which I take to mean the setting aside of the Notice.

[4]               Although prosecuted as an appeal, in reality this is an administrative law review: Canadian Committee for the Tel Aviv Foundation v. Canada, 2002 FCA 72 at paragraph 27.

The appellant sought leave to introduce certain evidence in the appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal and this is the decision of a single judge of the court on the appellant’s motion.

The court first set out the tests for introducing evidence on such an appeal:

[9]               As a general rule, the only material that can appear in the appeal book on an administrative law review is material that was before the Minister when she made her decision: Renaissance International v. Minister of National Revenue, [1983] 1 F.C. 860 (C.A.); Stawicki v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2006 FCA 262; United Scottish Cultural Society v. Canada (Canada Revenue Agency), 2004 FCA 324 at paragraph 5.

[10]           Limited exceptions to the general rule exist: Association of Universities, supra at paragraph 20; McFadyen v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 360 at paragraphs 14-15; Keeprite Workers’ Independent Workers Union et al. and Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 162 (Ont. C.A.).  These include materials:

•                     that provide general background in circumstances where that information might assist;

•                     necessary to bring to the attention of the reviewing court procedural defects, such as bias, that cannot be found in the evidentiary record of the administrative decision-maker; and

•                     that highlight the complete absence of evidence before the administrative decision-maker when it made a particular finding.

These exceptions are best understood not as rules to be blindly applied, but rather applied sensitively in light of the differing roles played by the reviewing court and the administrative decision-maker:  Association of Universities, supra at paragraphs 14-19.

As a preliminary matter the court refused to consider material pre-dating the Minister’s decision which the appellant had not provided to the Minister prior to that decision:

[14]           Much of the material the appellant seeks to introduce into this appeal is dated between October 1, 2012 and the date of the Minister’s decision, i.e., the December 11, 2012 Notice. The appellant could have written the Minister and could have asked to submit this material. But the appellant did not do so.

[15]           In my view, the appellant cannot now seek to introduce in this appeal the material available to it before December 11, 2012: Johnson v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 76 at paragraph 27. With diligence, the appellant could have provided this material to the Minister before she issued the Notice on December 11, 2012.

[16]           Accordingly, in this motion, I shall only consider material sought to be introduced by the appellant that it obtained on December 11, 2012 or later.

The remaining material fell into six categories:

1.    News Reports Said to Evidence Bias on the Part of the Minister Because of Canada’s Close Relationship with Israel

The court rejected this material:

[21]           This conclusion is not only founded upon the authorities cited.  It is also founded upon procedural fairness to the Minister. Had this bias issue been clearly raised, the Minister would have been able to respond in her decision. Then this Court would have the benefit, on review, of the formal allegation of bias and the decision-maker’s response.

[22]           There is a further reason for not including in the appeal book the documents in Exhibit “A” that postdate the December 11, 2012 Notice (Documents 13 to 18). In my view, the appellant has not established the relevance and materiality of these documents. In supplementary submissions made after a teleconference (described below), the appellant states that these documents “provide a further and more contemporary portrait of the strengthening of ties between Canada and Israel” [my emphasis]. Contemporary they are – by and large, they tend to record incidents reflective of the general state of Canada-Israel relations at the time they were written, which was after the December 11, 2012 Notice. I am not persuaded they speak to the orientation or apparent orientation of the Minister when she issued the Notice.

2.  Allegedly Defamatory Documents

The court rejected this material:

[26]           These documents have no bearing on the legality of the Minister’s decision.  Either the Minister had sufficient material before her to make a decision within a range of reasonable outcomes on December 11, 2012, or she did not.

[27]           In this case, these post-decision materials do not affect this question. Rather, the attempt to adduce these materials smacks as an attempt to introduce more information of the sort that was already before the Minister at the time she made her decision. These materials also have no relevance to the appellant’s other grounds for appeal.

3.  Unredacted Access to Information Documents

The court rejected this material since the Minister submitted evidence that she never had access to the unredacted materials and based her decision, in part, on the redacted materials.

4.  Bank Account Termination Materials

Again the court rejected this material:

[37]           In the teleconference, the appellant confirmed it is arguing in this appeal that the Minister’s allegations that the appellant was associated with a certain terrorist group caused it harm, such as the termination of its banking privileges, effects on its finances, and the termination of its involvement in the Reviving the Islamic Spirit event. The appellant says that these effects, and perhaps others, manifest injury to its Charter rights and freedoms, particularly its associational freedoms and equality rights. The appellant is not arguing that the issuance of the Notice itself infringed the Charter.

[38]           The record on this motion shows that, indeed, the Minister alleged that the appellant was associated with a certain terrorist group. But there is no evidence that the Minister decided to disseminate those allegations to anyone but the appellant for the purpose of obtaining the appellant’s evidence and submissions on the matter.

[39]           The Notice, itself, does not refer to the allegations. Rather, as one of the four grounds for revocation, it says that the appellant did not “maintain direction and control over the use of its resources and failed to implement due diligence procedures,” contrary to paragraph 168(1)(b) of the Act. In the teleconference, the Minister confirmed that the allegations were relevant only to this ground of revocation.

[40]           The mere making of allegations is not a decision susceptible to review under the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7. If recourse for that can be had, it lies elsewhere.

[41]           Only the legality of the Notice is before us in this appeal, not the allegations made. This is confirmed by the wording of the appellant’s amended notice of appeal and the relief sought: see paragraph 3 above.

5.  Documents Relating to the 2012 Finances of the Appellant

The court rejected this material because it related to the consequences of the Minister’s decision, not the legality of that decision.

6.  Documents Relating to the Appellant’s Withdrawal as Sponsor of a Major Event

The court similarly rejected this material since it again dealt with the consequences of the decision, not whether it was legal.

***

In the result the appellant lost on all grounds and was ordered to bear the costs of the motion.

Comment:  This case highlights the importance of making one’s case to the Minister as thoroughly as possible when a charity is threatened with de-registration.  Once the Minister issues a revocation of a charity’s registration it will often be too late to bring additional material to the attention of the Federal Court of Appeal.

[1] 2013 FCA 178.